

**Mayor and Councillors
COUNCIL**

7 DECEMBER 2017

Meeting Status: **Public**

Purpose of Report: For Decision

**REVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTED MEMBER
REMUNERATION - LONG TERM PROPOSALS**

PURPOSE OF REPORT

- 1 This report presents to the Council for approval of feedback on part three of the Remuneration Authority Consultation Document Local Government Review

DELEGATION

- 2 Only Council may make a decision on this matter.

BACKGROUND

- 3 The Remuneration Authority ('the authority') is the independent body responsible for setting Elected Member remuneration.
- 4 The Authority released a consultation document in May 2017 in which it requested feedback, on proposed changes to the system of remuneration and allowances for Elected Members, in two stages.
- 5 Initial feedback was requested on Part Two of the Consultation Document which proposed short term improvements to take effect from 1 July 2017. In June 2017 Council provided feedback to the Remuneration Authority on Part Two of the document. Subsequently the Authority issued a new determination which took effect from 1 July 2017 covering local government remuneration and allowances.
- 6 The Authority is now seeking feedback on more fundamental changes to the system of Local Government Elected Members remuneration, captured in Part Three of the Consultation Document. This feedback is due by 15 December 2017. The Authority proposes to introduce any changes in 2019.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Issues

- 7 Proposed responses are attached as Appendix 1 to this report.
- 8 The Authority is proposing that the roles of Mayor and Regional Chair should be treated as full time roles. The Elected Members, having been invited to suggest feedback, one suggestion was that the roles of Mayor and Regional Chair should be treated as part-time roles. In its draft feedback to the Remuneration Authority, LGNZ suggest that 'The unpredictability of the mayoral role means that part time employment or other forms of complementary income consistent with mayors' variable working hours are seldom available. Therefore the mayor's role should be remunerated as if full-time...'. The current Mayor of Kapiti Coast District Council works in excess of 40 hours a week in the role.

- 9 With regard to the question of external representation roles being remunerated in a similar way to council positions of responsibility feedback was received from Elected Members against this proposal and also tentatively in support depending on the role. (Appendix 3 of report Corp-17-381) In its draft feedback to the Authority, LGNZ suggest 'additional remuneration would be warranted in cases, for example, where an elected member is appointed to a regional grouping tasked with a regional planning or investigative role where a major time commitment is involved. This should be a matter for council discretion.'
- 10 The question of community board remuneration coming out of the council governance/representation pool received general support in feedback from Elected Members. However one person agreed community board remuneration should come out of the pool but, at the same time, be decided by the Remuneration Authority. Another Elected Member also agreed with the Pool approach but highlighted that it needs to be clear that the size of the Pool is not changed according the number of Elected Members or because the Territorial Authority has Community Boards.
- 11 Contrasting feedback was received from Elected Members with regard to the Authorities proposal that local government remuneration be related to parliamentary remuneration. LGNZ, in its draft feedback to the Remuneration Authority suggest that 'In terms of the remuneration of mayors and regional chairs there may be a rationale to relate the top level of Mayoral or chair remuneration to that of the most senior cabinet member, however the relationship is not so clear when determining the remuneration of a mayor of a small district unless the view is taken that lowest end of the scale is equivalent to the income of a member of parliament.'

CONSIDERATIONS

Policy considerations

- 12 There are no immediate policy considerations.

Financial considerations

- 13 The costs of Elected Member remuneration, expenses and allowances have been budgeted for. A new determination issued by the Remuneration Authority, following feedback from councils on the proposed changes to remuneration and allowances will result in a review of that budget.

Tāngata whenua considerations

- 14 There are no tāngata whenua considerations.

SIGNIFICANCE AND ENGAGEMENT

Significance policy

- 15 This matter has a low level of significance under Council policy.

Consultation already undertaken

- 16 Elected Members have had the opportunity to review the proposals in the Remuneration Authority Consultation Document and comments from Elected

Members, following a briefing on 23 November 2017, have been captured in Appendix 3.

Engagement planning

17 An engagement plan is not needed to implement this decision.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18 That Council approve the feedback on the changes to Elected Member remuneration, expenses and allowances proposed by the Remuneration Authority as at Appendix 1 of report Corp-17-381.

Report prepared by	Approved for submission	Approved for submission
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Democracy Services Manager	Acting Group Manager Regulatory Services	Group Manager Corporate Services
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ATTACHMENTS

Appendix 1 Feedback on the Consultation Document Local Government Review, Part Three, Longer Term Proposals.

Appendix 2 Consultation Document Local Government Review

Appendix 3 Comments from Elected Members

Appendix 4 Draft Feedback from LGNZ

Feedback on the Review of Local Government Elected Members Remuneration Consultation

Document - Part Three – Longer Term Proposals

Council Sizing

With regard to the proposed factors to be used for sizing councils

- Are there significant influences on council size that are not recognised by the factors identified?
NO
- Are there any factors that we have identified that you believe should not be used and why ?
NO
- When measuring council assets, do you support the inclusion of all council assets, including those commercial companies that are operated by boards ?
YES
- If not, how should the Authority distinguish between different classes of assets?
N/A

Weighting

- Are you aware of evidence that would support or challenge the relativity of the factors for each type of council?
- If you believe other factors should be taken into account, where would they sit relative to others?
NO

Mayor/Chair Remuneration

- Should mayor/ chair roles be treated as full time?
YES
- If not, how should they be treated?
- Should there be a 'base' remuneration level for all mayors/chairs, with additional remuneration added according to the size of the council?
YES
- If so, what should determine this 'base' remuneration?
Population of local authority or region.

Councillor Remuneration

- Should councillor remuneration be decided by each council within the parameters of a governance/representation pool allocated to each council by the Remuneration Authority?
YES
- If so, should each additional position of responsibility, above a base councillor role, require a formal role description?
YES

- Should each council be required to gain a 75% majority vote to determine the allocation of remuneration across all its positions?

YES

Councillor Remuneration

- Should external representation roles be able to be remunerated in a similar way to council positions of responsibility?

Possibly in the case of a member being appointed to a regional grouping where a major time commitment is involved. This should be a matter for council discretion.

- Do the additional demands placed on CCO board members make it fair for elected members appointed to such boards to receive the same director fees as are paid to other CCO board members?

NO

Community Board Remuneration

- Should community board remuneration always come out of the council governance/representation pool?

YES

It needs to be made clear, however, that the size of the pool is not related to the number of Elected Members.

- If not, should it be funded by way of targeted rate on the community concerned?

N/A

- If not, what other transparent and fair mechanisms are there for funding the remuneration of community board members?

N/A

A Local Government Pay Scale

- Is it appropriate for local government remuneration to be related to parliamentary remuneration, but taking account of differences in job sizes?

YES however clearer definition is required

- If so, should that relativity be capped so the incumbent in the biggest role in local government cannot receive more than a cabinet minister?

- If not, how should a local government pay scale be determined?



CONSULTATION DOCUMENT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW

Part One - General Introduction


Introduction

1. The Remuneration Authority (the Authority) is required to issue a new determination, taking effect from 1st July 2017, covering local government elected members. In considering how we should approach this in future, we have concluded that there is an opportunity for both short term improvements to the system, including some clarification of current policies, as well as some deeper changes which we propose introducing in 2019.
2. Hence this paper has two substantive sections – Part Two covering proposals for this year and Part Three covering the longer term. We are seeking views of councils on both. The timetable for responses on the shorter-term proposals is unfortunately short. This is because as we got deeper into our review we saw the need for more fundamental change which, had we waited till we had all detail finalised, would have delayed our release of this paper. However, we feel that the issues in Part Two are sufficiently familiar for councils that they will be able to provide reasonably rapid responses. In contrast, Part Three contains more fundamental change proposals and we believe that the local government sector needs time to contemplate these. We have provided a window of several months and during that time we would anticipate attending either zone or sector meetings to discuss the proposals with you.
3. Recently the issue of the potential provision of child care subsidies or services has been raised. We have not addressed it in this paper but will be consulting the sector shortly about this issue.
4. The Authority would like to thank a number of people who have assisted us with the review so far. We commissioned ErnstYoung to provide facilitation, research and analysis. The following people also provided assistance and we very much appreciated their insights and information:
 - Local Government Leadership Group:
 - David Ayers, Mayor, Waimakariri District
 - Jan Barnes, Mayor, Matamata-Piako District
 - Brendan Duffy, Independent Consultant and former Vice-President LGNZ
 - Justin Lester, Mayor, Wellington City
 - Jane Nees, Deputy Chair, Bay of Plenty Regional Council
 - Rachel Reese, Mayor, Nelson City

- Local Government New Zealand:
 - Lawrence Yule, President
 - Mike Reid, Principal Policy Advisor
- Local Government Commission:
 - Suzanne Doig, Chief Executive Officer
 - Donald Riezebos, Principal Advisor
- Local Government Officials:
 - Dennis Bush-King, Tasman District Council
 - Miranda Cross, Greater Wellington Regional Council
 - John O'Shaughnessy, Hastings District Council
- Central Government Officials
 - Deborah Brunning, Statistics New Zealand
 - Sarah Lineham, Office of the Auditor-General
 - James Stratford, Department of Internal Affairs
- Alistair Gray, Statistics Research Associates Limited

Legal requirements for the Authority when setting remuneration

5. The work of the Authority is governed by the Remuneration Authority Act 1977, which has had several amendments since it was first enacted. This act and the Local Government Act 2002 contain the statutory requirements which the Authority must follow when making determinations for local government elected members. They are summarised below:



Role of local government

6. In undertaking this review the Authority has looked at past thinking on local government remuneration. One particular document¹, issued by Local Government NZ in 1997, contained a thoughtful summary of the role of local government.

7. The document said:

“The strength of representative democracy ultimately depends on two factors. One is the level of citizen participation and trust in democratic institutions. The other is the ability and commitment of elected representatives and their role in encouraging participation and promoting levels of trust.

Local government constitutes one of the underpinning structures of democratic society, providing ‘voice and choice’ to citizens and communities, and the mechanism for making decisions about local needs and preferences. It also provides a forum to debate issues of mutual interest and concern.

Good local government depends upon the goodwill and understanding of its citizens, and the quality of its staff. Most of all, however, it depends on the ability of those elected to govern. Attracting people with the capacity to lead and govern at local level involves a number of factors. These include:

- The opportunity to contribute effectively, be professionally valued and receive a sense of satisfaction at achieving a job well done*
- The existence of structures and processes to support and professionally advise elected members and enable them to contribute constructively on matters of community importance*
- The presence of consultative and participative arrangements that strengthen relationships between and with their communities*
- The existence of a remuneration system that enables people from all sectors of the community to commit time and effort necessary to fulfil their responsibilities as elected members without being unduly disadvantaged.”*

8. In our view, this characterisation of local government has not changed since it was written twenty years ago.

¹ Options for Setting Elected Members’ Remuneration – A Discussion Document for Local Government and Stakeholders, prepared by the Local Government New Zealand Elected Members’ Remuneration Working Party (1997)

Part Two – Proposed Immediate Changes (2017 Determination)

Introduction

9. The Authority is seeking the views of local government (i.e. territorial authorities, unitary councils and regional councils) on the proposals set out below in this section of the paper. These changes will affect elected mayors, chairs and councillors from each council including Auckland (councillors and local board members). Part of it will also affect community board members.
10. Please note that we are seeking the views of councils, not of individual elected members or staff.
11. We would appreciate any feedback that councils wish to give to be emailed to us by **5pm Monday 19th June 2017** or earlier if you can. Please email to info@remauthority.govt.nz

RMA Plan hearing fees

12. Current practice is that those elected representatives who are undertaking resource consent hearings can receive an hourly fee which is determined three-yearly by the Authority and which is not included in the council's pool of money to cover payment for additional positions of responsibility. This has not applied to other hearings conducted under the Resource Management Act (RMA). Nor does it apply to hearings for a plethora of other plans or policies developed by councils under different pieces of legislation.
13. The Authority has received many enquiries and suggestions from councils on this issue. In particular, there is growing concern about the treatment of often-protracted hearings of District Plans, Regional Policy Statements and other land, air, coastal and water plans under the RMA.
14. We have looked at the range of council plans that involve hearings and believe that many of them could be considered part of "business as usual" for councillors.
15. However, of particular concern is that councillors who sit on RMA plan hearings are required to be accredited commissioners. This means that they must have undertaken *the Making Good Decisions* course and they must renew their credentials every three years. The requirements for councillors are in this respect the same as for non-councillor commissioners and there is a cost in both time and money to gain and maintain the accreditation.
16. Because of the technical and legal nature of plan hearings, they tend to take months and, in some cases, can span an election period. This is especially the case if the hearing covers a review of the whole plan.

17. The Authority is aware of the increasing trend for councils to engage external commissioners as members of the panel for these plan hearings. This use of external contractors is being driven by several considerations, including time requirements, unavailability of sufficient numbers of councillors who are qualified commissioners, or a view that because councillors have developed the plans as part of their core business, the hearings should be conducted by a different set of independent commissioners. External commissioners are paid an hourly rate for the work. In some cases, a council will use a mixed panel of external commissioners and councillors, which clearly creates a disparity between panel members.
18. Because of these factors, we agree that any such hearings should be treated in the same way as resource consent hearings under the RMA insofar as councillor remuneration is concerned.
19. The Authority is proposing that an hourly rate should be paid to councillors who are members of such hearing panels.
20. The rate would be set every three years by the Authority, as with payments for consent hearings. It will apply to site visits, reading (not to exceed the hearing time) and, in the case of an elected person chairing such a committee, the hourly rate would also cover the time spent in writing the decisions. For clarity, we also propose that this last provision be included for elected members who are chairing resource consent hearings.

- **Do you agree that elected members who are sitting on plan hearings under the RMA should be remunerated in the same way as elected members who are sitting on resource consent hearings?**
- **Do you agree that elected members who chair such hearings should be remunerated for time spent writing up decisions?**

Leave of absence for elected members and acting mayor/chair payments

21. From time to time a councillor or mayor/chair needs extended leave of absence from council work. This could be for personal reasons such as family/ parental leave, extended holiday, illness or, in some cases, when standing for another public office. On these occasions the Authority is asked whether or not a council can grant such leave and, if it involves a mayor or chair, whether an additional payment can be made to the person (legally prescribed as the deputy) who is acting in place of the mayor/chair.

22. We have looked at the rules for governance boards in the state sector for guidance and adapted those rules for local government elected members. Rather than an ad hoc approach, we propose the following:

Councillors:

- Leave of absence without pay can be granted for a period of up to six months (maximum) by formal resolution of the council.
- The leave must involve total absence. The councillor cannot be present for any duties either formal or informal – this includes council meetings, meetings with external parties and constituent work. Nor can the councillor speak publicly on behalf of the council or represent it on any issues.
- The councillor's remuneration and allowances ceases during the period for which leave of absence is granted.

Mayors/Chairs:

- Leave of absence without pay can be granted for a period of up to six months (maximum) by formal resolution of the council.
- Notwithstanding the above, the period must be longer than a single cycle of council meetings, whether that be monthly or six weekly or whatever. This is because we consider that one of the key roles of a deputy mayor/chair is to cover for short absences by the mayor/chair, but that a longer absence would necessarily put an unexpected extended work burden on the deputy.
- If the deputy is to be paid extra remuneration for the period concerned, the leave must involve total absence. The mayor/chair cannot be present for any duties either formal or informal – this includes council meetings, meetings with external parties and constituent work. Nor can the mayor/chair speak publicly on behalf of the council or represent it on any issues.
- The remuneration to mayor/chair ceases during the whole of the period for which leave of absence is granted and the deputy is acting in the role.
- Allowances including a mayor/chair vehicle will also be unavailable to the mayor/chair during that period, but would be available to the acting mayor/chair.
- We propose that under these circumstances the council may pay that deputy a sum up to the normal remuneration of the mayor/chair in place of the normal remuneration received by the deputy.

23. Councils may make decisions within the parameters of these rules but must inform the Authority as soon as possible.

24. We have reflected on the proposed six-month period and consider that it is likely to require exceptional circumstances for an absence of that period to be granted, especially to someone in a leadership position on a council. It would mean that the constituents who elected that person would be unrepresented or, under a multiple-member ward, less represented, than would normally be the case. This would be an electoral risk that the

person concerned would need to consider carefully. However there may be circumstances where it is appropriate so we are proposing that the maximum period would be six months.

25. A further issue is the extension of an acting role beyond the anticipated length of time – for example, if the incumbent were elected to another role and there needed to be a by-election. Under those circumstances, if the incumbent is the mayor or chair, and the deputy was acting in the role, that the acting role may need to be extended for a further period, perhaps up to three months. In that case, we advise that councils make a new, separate decision regarding the remuneration and allowances.

- **Do you agree that there should be provision for elected members to be granted up to six months leave of absence without pay? If not, what should be the maximum length of time?**
- **Do you agree that additional remuneration can be made to the deputy mayor or chair to act in the role under the circumstances outlined?**
- **If you disagree with any of the conditions, please state why.**
- **Are there any other conditions that should apply?**

Approach to expense policies

26. The current approach is for each council to send in their policy to the Authority every three years for approval. In between we often receive requests for assistance in interpreting the provisions in the determination. We are aware of the need for policies to be more transparent and for greater clarity in the explanatory notes, both in determination and on our website.
27. We have looked at many council expense policies and it is clear that some are struggling to develop them, possibly because small staff size does not provide any depth of expertise in this area. On the other hand, some policies are highly developed and contain clear guidance as to what is permitted and under what circumstances.
28. We are thus proposing that instead of each council needing to develop a policy from scratch and then gain approval from us, we work with local government to develop a prototype policy that could be adopted by all councils.

29. The metrics in such a prototype would obviously be the top (maximum) of the allowed range, so any council wanting to pay/reimburse less (or even nothing at all) would be free to do so.
30. With respect to the current role of the Authority in authorising or checking such policies, this is enabled by the legislation and has been required in our previous determinations. However, the Authority proposes that such compliance audits should be part of the role of local government auditors who should check council expenses policies to ensure conformity to the Determination. Auditors should also be assessing whether councils are actually following their own agreed policies in this area.

- **Do you agree that the Remuneration Authority should supply a prototype expenses policy that will cover all councils and that councils should be able to adopt any or all of it to the upper limit of the metrics within the policy?**
- **Do you agree that each council's auditor should review their policy and also the application of the policy?**

Provision of and allowances for information and communication technology and services

31. A communications allowance has been included in the determination since 2008, and was introduced to bring some equity across the country in the reimbursement of costs and the provision of such support to elected members.
32. The continuing development of information and communication technology (ICT) has led the Authority to reconsider the allowance. Our view is that elected members should not carry the costs of communicating with councils or with residents.
33. Mobile technology is now ubiquitous and so much business is now conducted digitally that mobile phones and tablets are considered tools of trade in many businesses, in both the private and public sectors. It is no longer considered to be a personal benefit for a person to have her/his basic technology integrated with that of the business.
34. The Authority's preferred approach in the past was that councils provided the necessary equipment, consumables and servicing, as well as reimbursement (on proof of expenditure) of other costs that might occur. However, there was also provision for hardware costs incurred by elected members to be partly reimbursed.
35. Given recent changes in both the business environment and in technology, we are now of the view that all councils should provide an appropriate council-owned technology suite for their elected members. The two exceptions to this are payment for the use of broadband,

which can vary greatly depending on the nature of the household of the elected member, and payment for phone usage.

36. The complexities of ensuring that security is kept up to date mean that elected members are likely to find it increasingly difficult to manage the technical demands of being part of a larger organisation, which may have more stringent standards than they would have for their own personal technology. For the councils, there should be a major benefit in having all elected members using identical technology and systems, managed efficiently and effectively by the council's ICT officials. Councils often have complex software driving different parts of their systems (e.g. water plants) and possess large databases of residents and ratepayers. Managing these systems in a robust way and decreasing the possibility of cyber-attack is a challenge and will be assisted if there are fewer different entry points into the main system. This is also a protection for both the council and for residents/ratepayers who may have privacy concerns.

ICT hardware

37. It is the responsibility of each council to decide the communications equipment needed to carry out its business effectively and efficiently. Decisions about equipment for individual councillors should flow from that. We note that councils should be able to get good purchasing leverage on equipment and on usage plans to keep costs down.
38. We propose that councils provide all elected members with the following equipment:
- a mobile phone
 - a tablet or laptop
 - a monitor and keyboard if required, plus the hardware to connect the various pieces of equipment
 - a printer
 - a connection to the internet.
39. Consumables such as paper and ink should also be supplied by the council as required by the elected member.
40. In the past, there has been a desire by some elected members to utilise their own communication equipment to undertake council business, possibly because of unwillingness to segregate personal and council usage on the same device. Now it is commonplace for people to have more than one account on one computer, so the issue of carrying round an additional tablet should no longer apply.
41. Equipment would remain the property of the council and be replaced or updated as part of the council's asset renewal programme – presumably triennially. This would allow councils to obtain the advantages of bulk purchase and ensure maximum efficiency by providing equipment that is consistent across the organisation, fit for purpose and adequately protected to provide security and privacy for ratepayers, elected members and staff.

42. Where there is a strong reason for the council not to supply the technology, the Authority would need to make a decision allowing that council to put in place a reimbursement system. We note that there is a cost in time and money to all parties in managing such a system and it would have the inherent technology security weaknesses described above. In such cases, exceptional circumstances would need to exist before the Authority was prepared to move to a reimbursement system. In addition, in the interests of efficiency, the reimbursement system would need to apply to the whole council, not just to a few councillors.
43. Where council decided to provide an allowance for the use of personal ICT hardware, it should cover all ICT equipment used by members and the Authority would prescribe an upper limit for expenditure. This would represent three years' depreciation on the hardware (mobile phone, tablet/laptop, printer, monitor, keyboard, installation of an internet connection) plus an assumption that half the usage would be on council business. The allowance can be paid monthly or at the beginning of a triennium.

Internet usage and phone plans

44. Previously the Authority considered the extent to which the costs of data and phone use were apportioned between council and elected member. This can be complex and will reflect differing household usage as well as council usage. For example, in a household which already has personal usage close to their broadband cap, the increased traffic required to move to electronic papers may require an increase in monthly band usage, even though the data transmitted is modest compared to other internet and electronic traffic.
45. With regard to home broadband, we propose that elected members should be responsible for their own plan. The Authority previously determined that no more than 25% of the usage charges could be regarded as bona fide additional costs incurred by an elected member in carrying out council business. We accept that this is still the case but note that there is now a huge variety and combination of plans available for home broadband, so arriving at an "average" is simply not possible. We therefore propose that councils continue to reimburse up to 25% of a maximum dollar amount to each elected member to cover internet usage costs, on production of receipts. The Authority would review the percentage and the maximum amount every three years.
46. The use of mobile phones as a primary form of communication is increasing exponentially. Alongside this is a proliferation of different types of plans for mobile phones, paralleling what is happening in home broadband connections. The difference between home internet use and phone use is that for the home broadband, anyone else in the household can access the internet connection, whereas a phone is a personal device. We therefore consider that, except for mayors and chairs, elected members should receive reimbursement of up to half the cost of their personal mobile phone usage up to a maximum dollar amount, on production of receipts. If the council owns the plan, the same rule would apply as for home broadband use - the council would pay for half the annual

usage cost with a capped dollar amount and the elected member would need to reimburse the council for the rest. Elected members would be charged for all private international calls.

47. For mayors and chairs the council should cover the total cost of the plan, except that the user will be charged for private international calls.

Unusual circumstances

48. Over the years the Authority has occasionally been approached to cover the one-off costs of providing connection access or non-standard equipment where regular landline or mobile coverage is not available. We propose to continue the current policy, which is that where such circumstances exist, the council may put a costed recommendation to the Authority for approval to make a one-off payment for installation and either a reimbursement or allowance for on-going maintenance and support reflecting the costs involved. It is anticipated this allowance will normally reflect no more than 75% of the costs involved.

- **Do you agree that it should be common policy for councils to provide the ICT hardware proposed above for all elected members?**
- **Do you agree that exemptions to this policy would be limited to exceptional circumstances?**
- **Do you agree that a proportion of the ongoing cost of the use of home internet and personal mobile phones should be reimbursed as outlined above?**
- **If you disagree with either of these proposals, please give reasons and outline your alternatives.**
- **Do you agree with the “unusual circumstance” provision in para 49 above?**

Travel time allowance

49. We do not propose to make any changes to the approach on travel time allowances. This provides for all elected members who are not full time to be eligible for an hourly allowance when travelling on business for the council or community board in respect of any travel exceeding an hour and assuming the fastest form of transport. The rate is set by the Authority and is reviewed each three years.

- **Do you agree that the current policy on travel time allowance should be continued?**
- **If not, please state reasons for change.**

Mileage claims

50. About two thirds of all mayors/chairs take up their entitlement to have a dedicated vehicle provided for them by the council. Others choose to use their own vehicle for a variety of reasons but often, we understand, because of a belief that their constituents will not approve of them having the “perk” of a council vehicle. Our view is that for mayors/chairs, who normally travel great distances each year, the car is a “tool of trade” and an entitlement rather than a “perk”. In any other occupation, people who travelled the distances clocked up by most mayors/chairs would be provided with a company car rather than having to use their own.
51. We have checked the distances travelled annually by mayors/chairs. The average and the median are both around 22,000 to 23,000km a year. Unsurprisingly the distances vary greatly – from 35,000km down to a few thousand – though we wonder if the lower level reflects the fact that some who use their own vehicles claim very little. In fact at least three make no claims whatsoever.
52. Currently we utilise NZ Automobile Association metrics regarding the cost of running a vehicle and we use IRD formula for mileage rate reimbursement. We propose to continue to use these benchmarks, which will be updated as appropriate. The one exception is that in recognition of the fact that mayors/chairs using their private vehicles are likely to be in the medium/high group of users of their own cars for work purposes, we propose to alter the formula around the application of the higher and lower IRD rates.
53. At present the higher rate (currently 74 cents per km) applies to the first 5000km travelled on council business and the remaining distance on council business is reimbursed at a rate of 37 cents per km. We propose that above that first 5000km, which would act as a base, mayors/chairs using their own vehicles should be reimbursed at the higher rate for the first 25% of the remaining distance they travel on council business.
54. We have no data about councillor use of personal vehicles on council business and we assume that distances travelled would normally be less than that of a mayor - but not always, especially in the case of a “distant” ward. Regardless, we propose that the formula outlined above also applies to councillor travel reimbursement.

- **Do you agree with the proposed change to the current 5000km rule?**
- **If not, what should it be and why?**

55. The other issue which we are frequently asked to clarify is the “30km rule”. We propose to keep this approach. Basically it recognises that virtually all New Zealanders have to pay the cost of their own transport to and from their work place. However, elected members also have other work in other places. The 30 km rule is based on an assessment that most people would live within 15 km of their work place. That means that a “round trip” to and from the “work place” – i.e. the normal council meeting place – can be claimed only if it is above 30km. If the trip to and from the council’s normal meeting place is above 30km, the first 30km are always deducted. This means that if an elected member lives closer than 15km, then no claim can be made for attending a meeting at the council office. If a member must come to the office twice in one day, if she/he is not simply taking the opportunity to go home for lunch, then the whole of the distance for the second trip may be claimed. This assumes that most workers travel to and from work only once per day, but recognises that elected members may have a formal meeting, say in the morning, then another meeting much later in the afternoon. We expect common sense to prevail in councils when authorising such claims.

56. With regard to work of elected members outside of the normal council meeting place, the full mileage can be claimed. That means that the elected member may claim from her or his home to the address of the meeting or event and back again by the shortest route.

57. If an elected member has an additional place of residence (e.g. a holiday home) the primary place of residence, normally identified by being her/his address on the electoral role, will be considered the official residence.

58. If a council is holding one of its normal meetings in a different venue - for example in an outlying town - then the full mileage can be claimed. However, we expect common sense to prevail. If the exceptional meeting place is just down the road from the normal venue then the 30km rule would apply.

- **Do you agree with the proposal to retain the 30km rule in its current form?**
- **If not, what should this rule be?**

Mayor/chair car valuations

59. We do not propose to make any changes to the valuation of the mayor/chair motor vehicle at this stage. The formula is consistent with the methodologies applied to valuing motor vehicles for full private use in public sector roles. The Authority's formula goes one step further in that it recognises that a greater proportion of vehicle usage by a mayor/chair is spent on council business rather than on personal use.
60. The formula and associated variables used to value mayor/chair motor vehicles will be reviewed with the main determination triennially. Any changes will be applied in election year.

Annual changes in remuneration

61. The main local government determination will usually be applied in election year, then in the intervening two years we propose to change remuneration to reflect changes in the Labour Market Statistics (LMS) – (see Part Three for more details on the timetable).

Changes following an election

62. The Authority is aware that there has been some confusion in the past regarding the exact days on which payment ceases for outgoing elected representatives and commences for those who are newly elected, and around remuneration continuing for those who are re-elected.
63. The following outlines the legal situation:
- All newly elected and re-elected local government members come into office the day after the results are publicly notified under S.86 of the Local Electoral Act 2001.
 - All sitting members vacate office on the same day.

Part Three – Longer Term Proposals

Introduction

64. The Authority is seeking the views of local government (i.e. territorial authorities, unitary councils and regional councils) on the proposals set out below in this section of the paper. These changes will affect elected mayors, chairs and councillors, as well as community board members, from every council except Auckland. Later this year we will be issuing an additional consultation paper on the Auckland Council, following the completion of its governance review. However, we are proposing that the general principles outlined in this paper around council sizing should apply to Auckland.
65. Please note that we are seeking the views of councils, not of individual elected members or staff.
66. We would appreciate feedback to info@remauthority.govt.nz by Friday October 20th 2017. Please email to info@remauthority.govt.nz

Recent history of local government remuneration setting by the Authority

67. In late 2011 the Authority issued a discussion document - *Review of Local Authority Remuneration Setting*. This was followed in November 2012 by a further document - *Remuneration Setting Proposals for Local Authorities* - which outlined the system that the Authority was proposing to institute from the 2013 election. A copy of that document is attached as *Appendix 1*. It transpired that for a variety of reasons in the years 2014 to 2016 the Authority did not completely implement the proposed process. However, significant elements are in place. Importantly, the work which the Authority commissioned from the Hay Group in 2015 remains current in our view and has provided useful data to assist with our current considerations.
68. To assist with context, the main elements of the 2013 proposal are summarised below. They were:
- a) Moving away from the traditional salary/meeting fee mix for local government remuneration.
 - b) Creating a size index for councils derived from population and council expenditure.
 - c) Basing the remuneration for councillors/mayors/chairs on:
 - the relative place of the council in the size index;
 - the job size of the positions as assessed for sample councils;
 - the proportion of full time work as demonstrated by survey results;
 - the Authority's pay scale.
 - d) Providing a pool for each council equivalent to one councillor's remuneration to be allocated for additional positions of responsibility.

- e) Reviewing local government remuneration approximately two years after each election and setting the base remuneration for councillor and mayor/chair roles at the beginning of each election year, together with provision for changes in positions of responsibility within each council.
- f) Recalculating annually each council's place on the size index and, in the following July determination, automatically applying any increase warranted, with the proviso that any reductions in the base remuneration would not be implemented during the term of that council.
- g) Providing a loading of 12.5% for unitary council remuneration to recognise their additional regional responsibilities.
- h) Retaining arrangements for resource consent hearings whereby elected members can be paid an hourly fee in addition to their base remuneration.
- i) Requiring councils to confirm their expenses policies only in election year rather than annually.
- j) Retaining valuation methodology for mayor/chair vehicles with adjustments made each year on July 1 to coincide with the determination.
- k) Various changes to community board remuneration setting.

69. The new system was in place for the 2013 Determination in which the Authority made the following comment: *"Aware of its responsibility of fairness to both elected members and ratepayers, the Authority moderated both increases and decreases to smooth the transition to the new system"*.

70. In the 2014 Determination, the same comment was made with the additional comment that *"this approach was continued, with moderation to reflect wage growth, this year"*.

71. In 2015 the same comment was again made. However, in issuing that Determination the Authority said the following: *"The relationships between council size and remuneration, as well as any necessity for moderation of large increases or decreases, will be reassessed during the 2015/16 year ready for implementation at the time of the 2016 local body elections"*.

72. During 2015 the Authority reviewed the framework again, including job-sizing the positions of a representative group of councils and assessing workloads. In issuing its 2016 Determination the Authority made the following comment: *"The Authority found clear evidence regarding the size of positions but has less confidence in the evidence relating to workload. Given that uncertainty, the Authority has not proceeded to fully or partially implement increases that would in many cases have been well in excess of 10%. It has instead applied increases to the base remuneration payable to councillors ranging from 1.5% to 3% depending on the size of the council. This reflects at the higher level the movements in the public sector remuneration more generally."* The following comment was also made: *"The Authority is also concerned that the expectations placed on local representatives continue to increase and remuneration does not in all circumstances reflect the skill and effort required from members. It will therefore begin further work this year to*

establish an ongoing basis for remuneration that treats both the ratepayer and the elected member fairly”.

Rationale behind current proposal

73. While the legal requirements are set out above in paragraph 2 of Part One (above), the Authority members have also decided that these legal requirements (including attraction and retention of competent people) should be aimed at attracting a wide variety of competent people and balanced by the need to have a local government remuneration system that is accepted in the wider community. To enable this, we require a robust process that is as transparent as possible, intuitively plausible and sustainable for the foreseeable future.
74. We recognise that whether or not the level of financial reward matches the personal contribution of any elected member is not necessarily a significant determinant of the willingness of many people to stand for election. However, remuneration may be an issue for some, depending on personal circumstances, and it may also become an issue for an incumbent deciding whether or not to continue.
75. In considering this proposal, the Authority has decided to maintain a number of existing approaches. The principal ones are:
- a) Maintaining a “total remuneration” approach rather than meeting fees.
 - b) Using a size index to determine relativity between various councils.
 - c) Adopting a “pay scale” for local government that is fair and seen to be fair.
 - d) Reviewing the components of the council size index every three years and applying appropriate factors to territorial authorities and regional authorities.
 - e) Recognising that unitary councils have dual responsibilities and sizing them accordingly.

Council Sizing

76. Overview

We define council size as the accumulated demands on any council resulting from its accountability for its unique mix of functions, obligations, assets and citizenry. The size of councils varies considerably. The most obvious difference is in the size of population with the biggest council (Auckland) having 1,614,300 citizens and the smallest (the Chatham Islands) just 610 at the last census. Even outside of these two, there still a wide population range from Christchurch (375,000) to Kaikoura (3,740).

77. However, despite their differences, there are also many similarities between different councils and the roles of elected representatives.
78. All local government representatives have a basic workload that includes decision-making around local plans, policies and regulations; civic representation; assisting constituents; and

working with other organisations (public and private sector). Importantly, councils are also tasked with employing a chief executive and monitoring performance and delivery.

79. With regard to differences, as noted above, the starkest is in population, but even then there is not an exact connection between population and work load. We have taken account of several characteristics in addition to population to compare the size of each council. We are limited by the ready availability of information. However, with the information that is available, we have been able to use statistical methods to identify several factors that are significant influences on the workload of Councils.
80. We can identify councils that are most likely to be comparable in size, despite differences in what brings this about. Such comparisons can never be exact, because amongst all the councils there are influences on their size that are either unique or unable to be quantified using existing evidence. The analytical approach taken this year by the Authority will be further developed whenever the information base is able to reflect such situations.
81. We considered a variety of factors that could be used for sizing councils and, after consultation and further analysis, we are proposing several factors, with some differences between territorial authorities and regional/unitary councils. The indicators for each factor came from official statistics and departmental reports, and they were analysed by standard statistical methods which enabled the variety of demands on councils from different sources to be compared and accumulated. The initial list of factors and the modelling was identified with a representative group of elected local authority leaders, and then developed further by the Authority.
82. The strong direct effects on size from population, assets and operational expenditure were modified by differences in guest night stays, social deprivation levels and physical size.

Factors proposed to be used in sizing

83. Territorial authorities:

- a) **Population.** This factor not only determines the scale of services that a council will provide, but also the rating base by which activities are funded. Population is most likely to be the indicator that most New Zealanders would use when asked to distinguish between various councils. The statistics we are using are the most recent population estimates by Statistics New Zealand.
- b) **Operational expenditure.** In many cases, operational expenditure correlates with population, but there are also some differences - in particular when a council may be in the midst of a specific expansion programme in a particular area of activity. Our data is taken from the annual accounts of councils.
- c) **Asset size.** This represents the capital base of the council that the council is required to manage, providing essential service such as water, wastewater, roads and flood protection, and also social infrastructure. One of the challenges in asset management is to ensure that assets do not lose value. In recent years there has been greater focus on asset management in the sector, requiring (if it is undertaken rigorously) a higher degree

of attention to detail on the part of elected members, not just the asset managers in the organisation. The data on asset size is also extracted from the consolidated annual accounts of councils and includes the value of their council controlled organisations (CCOs).

We acknowledge that there are different degrees of assets held by local government. Some have highly commercial assets with commercial boards comprising directors selected for their relevant competencies and business experience. Others have land holdings that are long-term and more “passive” investments. Others again are assets such as ports which although highly commercial and competitive are often also strategic assets for their local government owners.

There are also different degrees of oversight. Some councils are extremely “hands on” with their assets and others are more arms-length in their relationships, particularly with CCOs. We recognise that whatever measure of asset size is used, its relevance will differ somewhat among councils to a greater extent than is likely with other factors.

- d) **Social deprivation.** This measures the differences between councils in their need to take account of economic disadvantage among citizens. We recognise that in many council districts the high level of social deprivation in some areas is counterbalanced by a higher economic status in others. However, we believe there are some councils that do not have this balance and that, given the reliance of many councils on rates income, for those councils a high level of social deprivation will have a significant impact. Data is drawn from the third quartile of the NZDEP index prepared from the last population census.
- e) **Number of guest nights.** This represents the demands on councils (e.g. infrastructure development and service provision) resulting from visitors. We recognise that this is a current issue which may in future years be resolved and that it is but one sector in New Zealand’s economy which is of concern to local government. However, it has been raised with us on many occasions and we believe it is relevant to allow for such demands being faced by council at present. It may be that it is replaced by another factor in future years. For this factor we use the Monthly Accommodation Survey of Statistics New Zealand. We were unable to find any data on visitors who may pass through a district and use facilities but not stay overnight, or on the current vexed issue of freedom campers.

84. Regional councils:

Although all councils (territorial, regional and unitary) have a power of general competence, the legal responsibilities of regional councils and unitary councils differ from those of territorial authorities. The breadth of their mandate in national legal instruments (such as the Resource Management Act) requires regional and unitary councils to operate at a different scale from that of territorial authorities, especially in their focus on regulating and managing land and water. For example, regional and unitary councils must develop and administer Regional Plans and Unitary Plans, and territorial authorities must give effect to these plans, which drives behaviour around issues such as water quality (i.e. storm water

and waste water). In contrast, regional councils do not have the significant focus on social issues that is required from either unitary or territorial councils. Hence **land size** is inherently important to the work of a regional or unitary council. In measuring size, we are proposing to eliminate the deprivation index factor for regional councils and add a land area factor.

85. Unitary councils:

For some years, the Authority has added a loading of 12.5% to account for the additional regional council responsibilities of the four smaller unitary councils – Gisborne, Marlborough, Nelson and Tasman. This did not include Auckland, even though it is also a unitary council, because the remuneration for Auckland was considered separately when it was set up.

We are uncertain as to the basis for the 12.5%, and are thus proposing that this loading now be removed and that instead the size of these four unitary councils be measured by both the regional and the territorial authority factors. Thus the factors by which we measure the size of unitary councils would include both land area and social deprivation.

The Authority believes that with the additional regional council factor of land area included, this is a fairer way of sizing unitary councils.

With regard to the proposed factors to be used for sizing councils

- **Are there significant influences on council size that are not recognised by the factors identified?**
- **Are there any factors that we have identified that you believe should not be used and why?**
- **When measuring council assets, do you support the inclusion of all council assets, including those commercial companies that are operated by boards?**
- **If not, how should the Authority distinguish between different classes of assets?**

Weighting

86. The weight given to each factor was assessed intuitively by the Local Government Leadership Group, drawing on their knowledge and experience. These weights were then further refined by formal statistical analysis. The Authority has not yet completed this part of the exercise and, before we do, we would like to hear views on the proposed factors. Nevertheless, in our work to date, the following “order of magnitude” listing indicates what

we consider to be the relative importance of the various factors in determining size. They are listed here in terms of our current view of the highest to lowest influence on size.

87. Territorial authorities:

- Population; operational expenditure
- Assets
- Deprivation index; visitor nights

88. Regional councils:

- Operational expenditure; geographic size
- Assets; population
- Visitor nights

89. Unitary authorities:

- Population; operational expenditure; geographic size
- Assets
- Deprivation index; visitor nights

90. When the weighting exercise is completed, the size of each council estimated in this way will become the size index.

- **Are you aware of evidence that would support or challenge the relativity of the factors for each type of council?**
- **If you believe other factors should be taken into account, where would they sit relative to others?**

Mayor/chair remuneration

91. The work that the Authority commissioned from the HayGroup in 2015 included a review and evaluation of the roles of mayor, regional council chair, committee chair and councillor across 20 councils.

92. The evidence reported by Hay was that mayor and regional council chair roles generally require a full-time commitment, though this is not true in absolutely all cases. Even in smaller authorities where the mayor's role may not be full time, the nature of the job means that it is usually difficult to get another job to supplement what might not be a fulltime income. From the knowledge of members of the Authority and advice from a range of participants in local government, including the Advisory Panel, the Authority accepts that mayors/chairs are full time and we propose that mayor/chair remuneration be determined on this basis.

93. We are also proposing that there should be a “base pay” for all mayors/chairs. Additional remuneration would then be on top of this, depending on the size of the council.

- **Should mayor/chair roles should be treated as full time?**
- **If not, how should they be treated?**
- **Should there be a “base” remuneration level for all mayors/chairs, with additional remuneration added according to the size of the council?**
- **If so, what should determine this “base remuneration”?**

Councillor remuneration

94. The relativity between mayor/chair and councillors is somewhat more difficult to determine and we note that in 2015 the Authority suggested that although there was evidence about the size of positions, there was less evidence about workload.

95. We are aware that there are clear differences in both the job size and the workload of councillors on different councils for a several reasons. There can also be significant differences in workloads of councillors within a single council. The influences on a councillor workload obviously include measurable factors such as population and the other indicators we have outlined above in paragraph 5, as well as the number of councillors, which varies from council to council.

96. However, other influences include current issues within a council area and individual councillor interest in or affiliation to different interest groups. The latter also applies to workload differences amongst councillors on a single council, as does the appetite for work amongst different councillors. The Authority is not able to take account of such differences in our determinations. Nor are we able to provide for “performance pay”. This means that on any single council the remuneration of the hardest working councillor will be the same as that of the lowest contributor.

97. Having looked carefully at the sizing factors, and discussed mayor/chair and councillor relativity with a variety of people, we have formed a view that we are unable to accommodate the differences between councillors on different councils with sufficient granularity to have a single national approach. The large metropolitan councils, for example, seem to have a higher councillor workload than of smaller rural and provincial councils, though this is not a universal rule. Additionally, there are differences between

similar sized councils which are addressed at council level by the allocation of committee and portfolio responsibilities.

98. We are also conscious of the discrepancies amongst councils in the current relationships between councillor remuneration and that of the mayor/chair. The range is from 54% down to 21%, and in some cases the proportion appears to be arbitrary. Discrepancies are also evident where councils of similar size (population) show variances of up to 10% in the ratio between councillors and mayors/chairs remuneration. Some of this may be historical - the legacy of previous approaches - or the result of councils having decreased or increased the number of councillors over time.
99. The Authority is looking at a new approach that, while providing a fiscal framework, would put the decisions round the details of councillor remuneration into the hands of the local council, which we believe is better able to understand and reflect community needs than we are on a national basis.
100. We are looking at setting a total “governance/representation pool” that each council would distribute. The pool would be linked to the size of the council and thus be irrespective of the number of elected members. Because we are now proposing formally that all mayor/chair roles be considered full time, the Authority would be in a position to set the salary for that position. Thus the mayor/chair remuneration would be separately allocated by the Authority, but included in the governance/representation pool allocated to each council. However, remuneration for all other positions – councillors, deputy mayor/chair, chairs of committees, portfolio holders etc and community board members – would be allocated from its own pool by each council. The council’s proposed allocations would be forwarded to the Authority for inclusion in the Determination.
101. The pool proposal was included as one alternative in the 1997 LGNZ consultation paper, albeit the remuneration framework then was very different from how it has evolved today.
102. The advantages of this approach are that it focusses on the total governance and representation cost for each council (minus the mayor/chair) and that it allows each council to decide its own councillor and community board remuneration levels, including for positions of responsibility, reflecting its priorities for the current triennium. The total pool would be relative to the size of the council rather than to the number of elected members. Consequentially, if a council wished to increase its numbers via a representation review, and thus spread the workload, the allocated pool would need to be spread amongst more people. The reverse would also apply. It should be noted that if the workload for the whole council increased because of a change in the metrics of any factor(s) by which the council is sized, then the council would move to a higher ranking on the scale which would provide overall higher total remuneration pool.
103. The disadvantage is that no council is necessarily the master of its own destiny in terms of numbers of councillors. It must convince the Local Government Commission of the need to increase or decrease numbers. However, we do note that where representation changes

reflect changes in what we call the “size” of the council (as described above in para 77-91), any changes should also be reflected in the remuneration pool available to the council so there would then be a direct connection.

104. The pool approach provides councils with the flexibility to provide differences in positions of responsibility in a nuanced way. Because each council varies in terms of its committee/portfolio structure, this is an area where councils need discretion to decide. Current practice is for the Authority to set the councillor remuneration for each council, then to provide each council a “pool” equivalent to twice the base remuneration of one of its councillors to allocate to those undertaking specific positions of responsibility. These may include deputy mayor, committee chair, portfolio holder or other specifically designated roles. We have had no significant advice that the size of this extra pool is inadequate. However, we are aware that the provisions are applied in slightly different ways by different councils and that there are some councils that find the current provisions restrictive.
105. For example, there has been some confusion in the past as to whether every single councillor on a council can receive part of this additional pool by being allocated a position of responsibility. Generally, the Authority has not agreed to this when the council has proposed sharing the additional pool equally because this has simply amounted to a pay-rise for all councillors to move them above the level applied in the Determination. However, we have had enquiries about this and also observed current practice.
106. We propose that under the new regime (i.e. a total governance/representation pool for each council) the following rules should apply:
- a) All roles and remuneration levels will need to be agreed by formal resolution of the council, with a 75% majority.
 - b) A remuneration rate must be set for the base councillor role
 - c) The council needs to have a formal written role description for each additional position of responsibility above that of the base councillor role.
 - d) The Authority will expect that any such roles within a council will have different levels of additional remuneration, depending on the nature and workload involved. In particular this needs to apply where every single councillor is allocated an additional position (as distinct from a more usual practice of having a deputy mayor/chair and a handful of committee chairs).

- **Should councillor remuneration be decided by each council within the parameters of a governance/representation pool allocated to each council by the Remuneration Authority?**
- **If so, should each additional position of responsibility, above a base**

councillor role, require a formal role description?

- **Should each council be required to gain a 75% majority vote to determine the allocation of remuneration across all its positions?**

107. We also note that elected members are increasingly being appointed to represent their council on various outside committees and bodies. We propose that if any council wishes to do so, such appointments can also be captured under the process outlined above.

- **Should external representation roles be able to be remunerated in a similar way to council positions of responsibility?**

108. The issue of director's fees for elected members who are appointed to CCOs is a difficult one. On the one hand it could be said that a councillor sitting on a CCO is doing work that is similar to that of another councillor who may have a specified position of responsibility – or even less if the second councillor is, for example, a committee chair. However, the legal liabilities of CCO directors have become more onerous in recent years and may be more than those of elected members.

109. Those appointed as directors of CCOs need to be aware of the specific legislative duties and regulatory obligations that are imposed on them, in their capacity as directors, by the various acts, including the Local Government Act 2002, the Companies Act 1993, the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, the Charities Act 2005 and the Public Audit Act 2001.

110. It is not for the Authority to determine whether or not elected members should be directors of a CCO, but we do recognise the additional responsibility that is taken on in those cases and that it may require developing capabilities to meet obligations that are different from those required of other elected members. We also observe the increasing trend towards the appointment of external professional directors to such roles.

- **Do the additional demands placed on CCO board members make it fair for elected members appointed to such boards to receive the same director fees as are paid to other CCO board members?**

Community Board remuneration

111. We note that 40 councils (more than half the territorial authorities) have community boards. We also note that there is a huge variety in the nature of the work undertaken by community boards and in the powers delegated to them. Some undertake substantial and substantive governance work on behalf of the council, whereas others are more in the nature of community representatives and advocates.
112. We are also aware that in some places community board members are doing work that elsewhere might be undertaken by council officers. However, assuming that community boards are part of the governance/representation structure of a council, then this means that, all else being equal, the current cost of governance and representation for these councils could be relatively higher than that of councils which do not have them. Some councils fund the boards out of a targeted rate applied to the area that the board represents, whereas others use a general rate – i.e. the same as for funding the remuneration of councillors.
113. We suggest that if a council wishes to not cover remuneration for its community board members from the proposed governance/representation pool, then a targeted rate should apply to the area represented by the particular community board. However, councillors appointed to represent the council on the community board would be paid from the governance/representation pool.
114. We also consider that it is important that the functions undertaken by any community board are clearly and transparently defined by the council concerned and consider that all community board delegations should be by way of a formal council resolution.

- **Should community board remuneration always come out of the council governance/representation pool?**
- **If not, should it be funded by way of targeted rate on the community concerned?**
- **If not, what other transparent and fair mechanisms are there for funding the remuneration of community board members?**

A local government pay scale

115. Local government has no exact equivalent. The nearest that we have in New Zealand is central government, yet even that is not an exact match.

116. Section 2 of this paper sets out the legal requirements that the Authority is required to consider in making determinations. The first of those requires that the Authority “shall have regard in particular to the need to achieve and maintain fair relativity with remuneration received elsewhere”. This is particularly difficult in determining the remuneration for local government elected members because there is no obviously relevant comparator group. The Authority considered and rejected as inappropriate the following:

a) Local government senior managers’ salaries.

Information on local government management remuneration is readily available in market salary surveys and through councils’ annual reports. However employees of councils are selected for the knowledge, skills and experience they hold relative to the needs of the employment role. Elected members do not fit that profile at all. They are democratically chosen by the electors to represent the interests of the people of a particular area and provide governance over the council’s operations. There is no logical alignment that would connect the remuneration of the two groups.

b) Central government sector senior managers’ remuneration.

Information on public sector management remuneration is readily available in market salary surveys and the State Services Commission’s annual reports but this option suffers from exactly the same difficulties as option (a) above.

c) Remuneration of directors on boards, including public sector boards, commercial boards and large not-for-profit boards.

A significant part of the work of elected members consists of representational activities of one sort or another. Most boards of directors do not have this role. Those that do are often in the not-for-profit or NGO sector and, even there, the nature and time requirements of the representational work, including managing constituency issues, is different. Further, most boards are governing an enterprise that is essentially focused on a single group of goods or services within one industry, whereas councils have a significant array of services that are not necessarily similar in any manner – for example, providing building consents compared to social services.

117. Other aspects of local government elected roles which differ from the above are:

- The sheer “visibility” of the people involved, resulting in a lack of privacy. In some cases where the elected person is very high profile or important in a community, or

when the community is very small, this is extreme and often their close family members are also impacted by this.

- This visibility is associated with the need for publicly elected representatives to “front” on difficult issues. This is less common amongst other boards members and managers. When something goes wrong on a council the councillors and mayor/chair are held to account by the public, whereas on a board it would normally (though we recognise not always) be the CEO.
- The meeting requirements on local government are more onerous than they are in other sectors. The Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 and public expectation is that meetings will be held in public and that information behind decisions and actions will be readily available.
- Finally, and perhaps related to all the above, local government entities hold far more frequent meetings/workshops than do other governance boards and the distinction between governance and management is less clear than it is in most other models.

118. In the light of this, the Authority looked at a possible alignment with parliamentary remuneration for comparative purposes. Even though (as we note above) local government is not an exact match to central government, parliamentarians are also democratically elected to represent sections of the populace, and those who are members of the Government of the day also exercise governance over the public service. Within the parliamentary group there are different levels of remuneration between backbenchers, ministers and some other identifiable roles.

119. Given the obvious difference between central and local government elected members, any remuneration alignment could not be a direct one-on-one relationship. However, the nature of the roles is such that there are also similarities and this is the closest the Authority can find to “fair relativity with remuneration received elsewhere”. As in other areas of our work, this decision involved a degree of judgement – there is no exact science here and we would observe that the utility and value of any elected person is in the eye of the beholder.

120. We therefore propose that mayor/chair remuneration be related to that of MPs, but capped so that the highest remuneration for any individual mayor or chair cannot be more than that of a cabinet minister. All other mayor/chair roles would be provided with a relative alignment below that upper limit.

- **Is it appropriate for local government remuneration to be related to parliamentary remuneration, but taking account of differences in job sizes?**
- **If so, should that the relativity be capped so the incumbent in the biggest role in local government cannot receive more than a cabinet minister?**

- **If not, how should a local government pay scale be determined?**

Timetable

121. The current practice of the Authority – major three-yearly reviews with annual updating in non-review years – has been a sensible approach. We propose to continue it in the interests of efficiency and also to reflect the fact that the data we are using for sizing is not necessarily available annually.
122. In the intervening years, we propose that any change in local government remuneration reflect the change in the salary and wage rates for the public sector as shown in Statistics NZ's Labour Market Statistics (LMS) which are produced quarterly. In 2014 the LMS replaced the Quarterly Employment Survey (QES), which was the mechanism chosen as the reference index when Parliament passed the Remuneration Authority (Members of Parliament Remuneration) Amendment Act 2015. Therefore, changes in MP remuneration are also tied to the change in salary and wage rates as published in the LMS. In addition to salary and wage rates, the LMS contain information on New Zealand's official employment and unemployment statistics, number of filled jobs by industry group, total hours worked, levels of income, total gross earnings and paid hours, and average hourly rates by sector.
123. The cycle adopted by the Authority for setting local government remuneration will be as follows:
 - The first year of the cycle will be the local government election year. In that year the Authority will undertake a full review of council sizes, utilising the indicators described above. Prior to applying the result of the review, the Authority will apply the LMS changes to all local government remuneration, and the council sizing results will then be applied.
 - This determination will be issued on or about July 1 for implementation from the date the council formally takes office following the local government election later that year. At that time the Mayor/chair remuneration will be applied but the remuneration for all other positions to be decided out of the "governance/representation pool" will be applied on the day following the day on which the council formally resolves its remuneration policy for that triennium. Until then, from the day of assuming office, all councillors will be paid the base councillor remuneration that applied in the preceding triennium. The new determination will apply till the council ceases to formally hold office at the next local government election.
 - Meeting fees for RMA plan or consent hearings, as well as the parameters for expense reimbursement, will also be assessed at that time and any changes will apply to all councils at the same time as the remuneration changes.
 - In the subsequent two years, the determination will again be issued on or about July 1 but on these occasions for immediate implementation. For all councils, it will

contain adjustments reflecting the change in the LMS. There will be no changes in plan or consent hearing fees or expenses policies at this time.

This consultation process from now on

124. This proposal is being circulated to all councils to obtain feedback on the approach. The Authority would need to receive any written feedback that councils wish to make by **30 October 2017**. We look forward to hearing from you.
125. For this year (2017) the Authority proposes to change remuneration according to the LMS change and we also propose to introduce the new provisions outlined in Section Two of this paper. All other changes would be introduced for the year 2019. This timetable allows time for councils to fully discuss the proposals and give us their responses. It allows us to then refine and test our final model for the “governance/representation pool” prior to implementation.
126. **We are conscious that 2019 is three years after the local government sector would have been expecting changes. However, with our proposal to change the model for sizing councils and to radically change the way councillor remuneration is decided, we believe that such a time period is justified.**

APPENDIX 3

	Councillor 1	CB Chair 1	CB Chair 2	Councillor 2 verbal
General Comments				Overall in support of the approach as explained by Fran Wilde.
Council Sizing				
Are there significant influences on council size that are not recognised by the factors identified?				
Are there any factors that we have identified that you believe should not be used and why ?				
When measuring council assets, do you support the inclusion of all council assets, including those commercial companies that are operated by boards?	Yes			
If not, how should the Authority distinguish between different classes of assets				
Weighting				
Are you aware of evidence that would support or challenge the relativity of the factors for each type of council?				
If you believe other factors should be taken into account, where would they sit relative to others?				
Mayor/Chair Remuneration				
Should mayor/ chair roles be treated as full time?	No			
If not, how should they be treated?	Part time			
Should there be a 'base' remuneration level for all mayors/chairs, with additional remuneration added according to the size of the council?	Yes			
If so, what should determine this 'base' remuneration	Population of local authority/region			
Councillor Remuneration				
Should councillor remuneration be decided by each council within the parameters of a governance/representation pool allocated to each council by the Remuneration Authority?	Yes	No if it is to the detriment of community boards, particularly when they don't have a vote.		
If so, should each additional position of responsibility, above a base councillor role, require a formal role description	Yes			

Should each council be required to gain a 75% majority vote to determine the allocation of remuneration across all its positions?	Yes	Yes		
Should external representation roles be able to be remunerated in a similar way to council positions of responsibility?	No	Maybe, but it depends what they are.		
Do the additional demands placed on CCO board members make it fair for elected members appointed to such boards to receive the same director fees as are paid to other CCO board members?	No			
Community Board Remuneration				
Should community board remuneration always come out of the council governance/representation pool?	Yes	Yes, but decided by the Remuneration Authority	Community board remuneration should continue to come out of the council representation/governance pool. This appears to be the most fair and equitable way.	Yes. It needs to be clear that Pool size is not related to number of EMs. It is not increased to accommodate the payment of CB remuneration.
If not, should it be funded by way of targeted rate on the community concerned?				
If not, what other transparent and fair mechanisms are there for funding the remuneration of community board members?				
A Local Government Pay Scale				
Is it appropriate for local government remuneration to be related to parliamentary remuneration, but taking account of differences in job sizes?	No	Yes		
If so, should that relativity be capped so the incumbent in the biggest role in local government cannot receive more than a cabinet minister?		Yes		
If not, how should a local government pay scale be determined?	Remuneration Authority			

19 October 2019



Review of elected members' remuneration

Introduction

LGNZ thanks the Remuneration Authority for this opportunity to contribute to its review of how it approaches the remuneration of elected members. We are pleased that the Authority is committed to finding solutions to the ongoing problems that have beset the remuneration of elected members for many years.

As we note in the body of the submission, since the LGA 1974 Amendment Bill No. 3, which transferred responsibility for remuneration of elected members to the Minister of Local Government, the way in which remuneration has been set and the level of remuneration itself have been subject to constant change. It is a situation that elected members find both frustrating and stressful and which undermines their ability to plan for the future. It also inhibits efforts to interest citizens in standing for local office.

LGNZ is committed to working with the Remuneration Authority to put in place a remuneration approach that is fit for purpose, enables elected members to fulfil their statutory and community duties and is sustainable for the long term.

Council sizing

With regard to the proposed factors to be used for sizing councils are there significant influences on council size that are not recognised by the factors identified?

Yes. In addition to the factors identified councillors' workload is also influenced by two additional factors;

- the degree of heterogeneity within a jurisdiction as in such communities citizens' preferences will be diverse, and
- the rate of population change, whether increasing or declining.

Both factors can be measured reasonably well through census data and Statistics NZ sub-national population projections

Are there any factors that we have identified that you believe should not be used and why?

No; we support the identified factors and have suggested some refinements (see above). We note that some commentators have suggested that "deprivation" is not a relevant factor on the basis that "redistribution" is generally regarded as the responsibility of central government. On the basis of LGNZ's experience, however, community deprivation does appear to have a material impact on the workload of councillors in districts where deprivation exists. This occurs as a result of factors such as:

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- demands made on elected members a result of citizens unable to meet the cost of providing and/or upgrading basic services;
- constraints on the level of rates that can be charged which limits the ability of a local authority to adequately meet government regulations and standards – effectively a form of austerity, and
- pressure on councils to advocate on their community's behalf for better public services, ranging from policing, mental health services to schools, is substantial. Low socio economic areas inevitably have poorer public services and councils often find themselves acting as a quasi government department and “topping up” failing public services.

It is important to note that NZ does not have any form of equalisation funding for councils representing low socio economic communities.

When measuring council assets, do you support the inclusion of all council assets, including those commercial companies that are operated by boards?

Yes, and to avoid any doubt inclusion should extend to assets held in CCOs.

If not, how should the Authority distinguish between different classes of assets?

N/A

Weighting

Are you aware of evidence that would support or challenge the relativity of the factors for each type of council?

For territorial councils population and asset management are to major drivers of councillor time and complexity of decision-making. For regional councils area is more important than population.

If you believe other factors should be taken into account, where would they sit relative to others?

This depends upon the way in which the formula is intended to work, for example, the rate of population change and degree of population diversity could be designed to be a weighting added on population numbers

Mayor/chair remuneration

Should mayor/chair roles should be treated as full time?

Yes. The unpredictability of the mayoral role means that part time employment or other forms of complementary income consistent with mayors' variable working hours are seldom available. Therefore the mayor's role should be remunerated as if full-time with variability determined by council size.

If not, how should they be treated?

N/A

Should there be a “base” remuneration level for all mayors/chairs, with additional remuneration added according to the size of the council?

Yes

If so, what should determine this “base remuneration”?

While historic practice has been to compare the role of a mayor to the role of a Cabinet Minister (since 1989 the Mayor of Auckland was seen to be equivalent to a Minister without portfolio) there are no equivalent private or public sector roles to that of a mayor.

Base remuneration needs to be at a level that will provide new mayors with an income sufficient to compensate them for the losses incurred as a result of giving up previous employment and the loss of taking time away from their particular profession.

If the Remuneration Authority wishes to pursue the analogy between local government and parliament by twinning the salary of the mayor of the largest city with the salary of the most senior Minister in Cabinet, then logically the lowest mayoral salary band should be the equivalent of the salary of an MP.

Please note that any reference to mayor remuneration also applies to the chairs of regional councils.

Councillor remuneration

Should councillor remuneration be decided by each council within the parameters of a governance/representation pool allocated to each council by the Remuneration Authority?

Since 1989 when the Minister of Local Government was charged with responsibility to make determinations for the remuneration of elected members followed by the decision to transfer this responsibility to the Higher Salaries Commission in 2001, the remuneration of elected members has been problematic and lacked consistency. Consequently it is difficult for prospective elected members to plan for the future with certainty and councils to establish sustainable administrative approaches.

It is vital that this review settle on a sustainable remuneration approach that will support councils and elected members for the future. Key principles will need to be met:

Simplicity and transparency – elected members, staff and most of all citizens must be able to understand the way in which the remuneration approach works and how levels of

remuneration are determined. This is essential for community confidence in our democratic institutions.

Certainty and simplicity – process needs to be clear and precise so that councils are able to interpret them without ambiguity and thus avoid the need to frequently seek advice or guidance from the Remuneration Authority. Achieving this will result in low administration costs for both councils and the authority.

Responsiveness – local government exists to meet the different needs of our different communities. Uniqueness is reflected not only in the nature of local services but also in the manner in which communities seek to be governed. Consequently remuneration approaches must be flexible enough to address variations in governance models in an accountable way.

Fairness – the Authority is required to maintain fair relativity with levels of remuneration received elsewhere. This can be seen as relativity with other sectors, such as parliament, and relativity between councils of similar circumstances (horizontal equity). The current remuneration model, adopted in October 2010, lacks relativity between councils of similar circumstances as the cost of governance is determined by the number of councillors rather than the size and nature of the council.

Adequacy – as required by the LGA 2002 remuneration should be set at a level that “attracts and retains competent persons” (Sch. 7 cl. 1(d)). Anecdotal evidence tells us that this is not currently the case with many reports of elected members retiring early due to the demands of office outstripping the remuneration received. (LGNZ will be undertaking a survey of elected members and past elected members over the next year to investigate this issue.) Adequacy is the relationship between remuneration received and the time demands of the position. It can be addressed by either increasing remuneration or decreasing the time required of members. This is an unresolved issue with the pressure on elected members increasing.

Neutrality – the way in which remuneration is set should not incentivise councils to prefer one governance model over another. In particular it should not influence decisions about the size of the governing body of councils or the way in which governance is structured.

Determining the right approach – salary or governance pool?

In developing remuneration models the Authority is faced with the need to find a balance between achieving national consistency and allowing for local diversity and flexibility.

- National consistency or a “one size fits all approach” appears to be administratively straightforward but given the diversity of our communities and the different approaches councils take when determining governance arrangements the Remuneration Authority receives frequent requests to approve local variations.

APPENDIX 4

- Enabling diversity, through pre-determined “governance pools” allows for differences in communities and governance arrangements, such as whether or not a council uses committees or portfolio holders, but can create challenges for governing bodies tasked with determining or recommending a remuneration approach.

The current model of elected member remuneration which sets councillor pay and provides a small top-up for additional responsibilities provides certainty of income, particularly for prospective elected members thinking about standing for office. However, over the last six years a number of problems have emerged such as:

1. the fact that the amount councils spend on governance varies according to the number of elected members they have (rather than the size of the governance task);
2. the difficulty of adjusting the models for bespoke governance approaches, and
3. the problem of adequately rewarding councillors who have been given significant additional responsibilities without adequate remuneration, such as councillors working on district plan reviews.

By itself a “pool” approach does not necessarily address these problems and can create other issues, such as those which occurred between 2004 and 2013 when the pool concept was previously used. For example:

The interregnum: The time taken between the swearing in of a new governing body its agreement to a remuneration model (the structure for the governing body and remuneration relativities) will generally take a number of months. That creates a dilemma for the Remuneration Authority as it is not clear how much each elected member should receive in remuneration for that period.

Public perception: many councillors and members of the public have concerns that the “pool” approach would appear as if elected members were determining their own remuneration. If this was the case it would be a worrying example of self interested behaviour and conflict with our norms of accountability and transparency.

The single national pool: a fatal flaw in the previous remuneration pool approach was the decision to have a single national pool consisting of each council’s pool. As a result where one council grew faster than others (especially if it was a large council) it consumed proportionally more of the national pool requiring a cut in the remuneration of the remainder. Managing this was extremely complex for the Authority leading to multiple temporary remuneration adjustments.

Community boards: the decision that 50% of community board remuneration would come from the governance pool was ultimately undermine relationships between boards and their governing bodies and incentivised councils to question whether

their district should have community boards. An approach in which community boards have their own pools is preferable.

Should the Remuneration Authority wish to re-introduce a pooled approach then these issues will need to be addressed.

The problem with the interregnum can be diminished if there is a 'default' governing template that could apply until new governing bodies meet and decide the option of their choice. A range of 'off the shelf' templates could speed up the process involved in selecting the appropriate governance model. It should also diminish the perception that elected members are deciding their own remuneration. It is important that their role is recommendatory only and that the Authority is the ultimate decision-making body.

The single national pool is not required. Each council pool should stand by itself and the size of that pool should only be governed by change in the 'sizing' formula and having separate pools for community boards removes the problems of governing bodies having a conflict of interest.

The other potential problem with the 'pool' approach is that it might incentivise councils to seek a reduction in councillor numbers as part of their representation review because a smaller governing body has the effect of increasing the remuneration of the members. We note that the size of governing bodies has fallen considerably since 1989 and now sits at approximately 11, leaving NZ with one of the highest representation ratios in the OECD. High ratios diminish the ability of citizens to engage with their representatives and reduce diversity.

The risk of the pool approach reducing the size of governing bodies and thus diminishing local representation (and democracy) is essentially controlled by the role of the Local Government Commission (LGC). As the court of last appeal it is the LGC that will ultimately decide the appropriate size of a governing body to ensure effective representation.

If so, should each additional position of responsibility, above a base councillor role, require a formal role description?

No. If a pool approach is selected there is no need for this level of prescription, as amongst other things, it would defeat the purpose of the pool approach. A better way of dealing with the matter would be to develop a range of remuneration templates and bespoke governance models. These could be approved by the Authority in advance and made available on its website for new governing bodies to choose from.

Should each council be required to gain a 75% majority vote to determine the allocation of remuneration across all its positions?

Yes

Should external representation roles be able to be remunerated in a similar way to council positions of responsibility?

This answer to this question depends on local circumstances, however it is not clear what situation is envisaged. In our view additional remuneration would be warranted in cases, for example, where an elected member is appointed to a regional grouping tasked with a regional planning or investigative role where a major time commitment is involved. This should be a matter for council discretion.

Do the additional demands placed on CCO board members make it fair for elected members appointed to such boards to receive the same director fees as are paid to other CCO board members?

Elected members appointed to CCO boards should be remunerated on the same basis as other CCO board members, unless their position as an elected member is a full time position and is remunerated accordingly.

Community board remuneration

Should community board remuneration always come out of the council governance/representation pool?

If the Remuneration Authority was of a mind to introduce a “pool” approach the remuneration of community boards should not come out of the governing body pool as it is impossible for councillors to make determinations without being seen to be self-interested.

Community boards must be seen as providing a level of community governance that is outside the role of governing bodies themselves and thus need their own remuneration approaches.

Community board remuneration is extremely complex given the myriad of roles boards play. This needs to be the subject of a stand alone consultation process with representatives of community boards themselves, including the Community Board Executive.

If not, should it be funded by way of targeted rate on the community concerned?

Whether community boards are paid out of a general rate or a targeted rate is a decision that is beyond the scope of the Remuneration Authority’s mandate (see Sch. 7cl.(39)) and best decoupled from the amount of remuneration boards should receive.

If not, what other transparent and fair mechanisms are there for funding the remuneration of community board members?

The LGA 2002 sets out clear and transparent processes, through their long term plans, for determining the degree to which the remuneration of community board members is met by a general or targeted rate. It is outside the scope of the Remuneration Authority's jurisdiction.

Local government pay scale

Is it appropriate for local government remuneration to be related to parliamentary remuneration, but taking account of differences in job sizes?

This question and the ones below are best considered in relation to the remuneration of mayors and regional council chairs rather than local government generally. The challenge when setting remuneration is to find an equivalent external benchmark and in the case of mayors there are limited choices. In 1989 the remuneration of the mayor of the largest city was pegged to the remuneration of a Minister without portfolio, however the relativity was quickly lost as mayoral remuneration, which was the responsibility of the Minister of Local Government and Cabinet, grew at a much lower rate than Ministerial remuneration, which was set by the Higher Salaries Commission.

In terms of the remuneration of mayors and regional council chairs there may be a rationale to relate the top level of Mayoral or chair remuneration to that of the most senior cabinet member, however the relationship is not so clear when determining the remuneration of a mayor of a small district unless the view is taken that lowest end of the scale is equivalent to the income of a member of parliament.

If so, should that the relativity be capped so the incumbent in the biggest role in local government cannot receive more than a cabinet minister?

There is no valid rationale for capping the remuneration of mayors or chairs to that of the highest paid Cabinet minister. It is simply a policy choice, although one that is not unreasonable. Alternatively the cap could be the salary of the Prime Minister.

If not, how should a local government pay scale be determined?

N/A